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George R. Boyer 
The Evolution of Unemployment Relief in Great 
Britain Unemployment was a major cause of economic inse-
curity for British workers throughout the nineteenth century. 
Business-cycle downturns occurred every five to eight years, and 
more than one-quarter of the years from 1834 to 1911 were 
plagued by high levels of cyclical unemployment. Even during 
prosperous years, many workers in seasonal or casual occupations 
experienced prolonged periods of unemployment. The average 
worker's savings were modest. A spell of unemployment longer 
than a few weeks led most manual workers to experience "acute 
financial" distress, forcing them to turn to other sources— 
typically local government or charities—for income assistance.1 
Relatively little has been written about unemployment relief 
during the period between the passage of the Poor Law Amend-
ment Act in 1834 and the adoption of national unemployment in-
surance in 1911. This study is an attempt to help fill the gap in the 
literature. It examines the changing roles played by poor relief, 
private charity, trade unions, and public employment in the lives 
of the urban unemployed during cyclical downturns from 1834 to 
1911. The story that emerges offers no support for a "Whig theory 
of welfare." Public assistance for the unemployed was more gen-
erous, and more certain, from 1834 to 1870 than it was from 1870 
George R. Boyer is Professor of Labor Economics, Cornell University. He is the author of An 
Economic History of the English Poor Law, 1730 1830 (Cambridge, 1990); co-author, with Timo-
thy J. Hatton, of "New Estimates of British Unemployment, 1870-1913, "Journal of Economic 
History, LXII (2002), 643-675. 
The author would like to thank Stanley Engerman, Christopher Hanes, Timothy 
Hatton, Frank Lewis, David Mitch, James Riley, and an anonymous referee for helpful com-
ments. 
© 2003 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, Inc. 
1 Business-cycle downturns occurred in 1837/38, 1841-1843, 1848/49, 1857/58, 1862, 
1867/68, 1878/79, 1885-1887, 1893-1895, 1904/05, and 1908/09. See Boyer and Timothy J. 
Hatton, "New Estimates of British Unemployment, 1870-1913, "Journal of Economic History, 
LXII (2002), 643-675; Charles H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the 
United Kingdom, 1833—1963 (Cambridge, 1972), T125-126; Walt W. Rostow, British Economy 
of the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1948), 123-125. The best discussion of the extent of work-
ers' savings during the nineteenth century is Paul Johnson, Saving and Spending: The Working-
class Economy in Britain 1870—1939 (Oxford, 1985), 87-125. 
394 | GEORGE R. BOYER 
to 1911, and the adoption of national unemployment insurance in 
1911 was more of a repudiation of late nineteenth-century public 
relief policies than an extension of them.2 
Most industrial cities continued to grant outdoor relief to 
cyclically unemployed males from 1834 through the late 1860s. 
However, local poor rates were not capable of indefinite expan-
sion, and during serious downturns, charitable organizations 
mobilized to raise money to help meet the high demand for assis-
tance. 
A major change in public policy toward the unemployed oc-
curred in the 1870s when cities throughout Britain sharply cur-
tailed the payment of outdoor relief to able-bodied males. During 
downturns, local governments and charities adopted ad hoc meth-
ods for relieving the unemployed, and many skilled workers re-
ceived unemployment benefits from their trade unions. The 
policy shift of the 1870s was a response to the Poor Law crises in 
London and Lancashire in the 1860s. The new solution proved no 
better at relieving the nonunionized unemployed—or preventing 
unemployment—than the Poor Law had been. The problems as-
sociated with relying on ad hoc emergency relief funds became 
apparent during the downturn of 1885/86, and the government 
2 The one major work on this period is Jose Harris, Unemployment and Politics: A Study in 
English Social Policy 1886-1914 (Oxford, 1972), but it covers only the three decades leading up 
to World War I. It deals more with the political aspects of unemployment relief than with the 
actual workings of local relief policies. William H. Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of In-
dustry (London, 1909), 150-191; Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The Minority Report of 
the Poor Law Commission. Part II. The Public Organization of the Labour Market (London, 1909), 
99—162, provide useful summaries of unemployment policies before 1914. Several studies of 
unemployment relief in a particular city at a particular time have been published. These in-
clude Frank Tillyard, "Three Birmingham Relief Funds 1885, 1886, and 1905," Economic Jour-
nal, XV (1905), 505—520; Edward G. Howarth and Mona Wilson, West Ham: A Study in Social 
and Industrial Problems (London, 1907), 337-384; Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A 
Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society (Oxford, 1971); James H. Treble, 
"Unemployment and Unemployment Policies in Glasgow 1890-1905," in Pat Thane (ed.), 
The Origins of British Social Policy (London, 1978), 147-172; T. Christopher Smout, "The 
Strange Intervention of Edward Twistleton: Paisley in Depression, 1841-3," in idem (ed.), The 
Search for Wealth and Stability (London, 1979), 218-242; Alan Kidd, "Charity Organization and 
the Unemployed in Manchester c. 1870-1914," Social History, IX (1984), 45—66; Keith Greg-
son, "Poor Law and Organized Charity: The Relief of Exceptional Distress in North-East 
England, 1870-1910," in Michael E. Rose (ed.), The Poor and the City: The English Poor Law in 
Its Urban Context, 1834-1914 (New York, 1985), 94-131. Quotation from Rose, "The Crisis 
of Poor Relief in England, 1860-1890," in Wolfgang J. Mommsen (ed.), The Emergence of the 
Welfare State in Britain and Germany, 1830 1930 (London, 1981), 52, who also rejects the 
"Whig theory of welfare." 
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responded by encouraging municipalities to set up work relief 
projects to aid the unemployed. However, the downturns of 1893 
to 1896 and 1904/05 revealed the inability of municipal work-relief 
programs to assist temporarily unemployed workers. From 1886 
onward, each business-cycle downturn put additional pressure on 
Parliament to set up a national system of unemployment relief 
The adoption of compulsory unemployment insurance in 
1911, paid for, in part, by a government subsidy, represented an-
other about-face in policy. Parliament's decision to set up a na-
tional system of unemployment insurance owed much to the 
lessons learned from the workings of trade-union unemployment 
schemes and the various forms of local unemployment relief from 
1870 to 1911. 
UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF, 1834-1870 The Poor Law remained an 
important source of income assistance to cyclically unemployed 
workers for at least three decades after the passage of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act in 1834. The Poor Law Commission and its re-
placement, the Poor Law Board, issued acts to restrict the payment 
of relief outside of workhouses to able-bodied males in 1842, 
1844, and 1852, but these orders were evaded by urban Poor Law 
unions throughout England and Wales, especially during cyclical 
downturns. Workers viewed the right to outdoor relief—relief at 
home rather than in a workhouse—when unemployed as part of 
an "unwritten social contract" with employers, and most local re-
lief administrators in industrial cities agreed. 
The Poor Law was administered at the local level. Before 
1865, each parish within a Poor Law union was responsible for re-
lieving its own poor. Poor relief was financed by a property tax, 
3 Poor Law unions were local government units, consisting of several parishes, established 
by the Poor Law Commission after 1834 to administer poor relief. Prior to 1834, the parishes 
alone were responsible for upholding the Poor Law. See Rose, "The New Poor Law in an In-
dustrial Area," in R. M. Hartwell (ed.), The Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1970), 121-143. 
Lynn Hollen Lees, The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the People, 1700 1948 
(Cambridge, 1998), 179-196, found that three London parishes and six provincial towns 
c. 1850 had large numbers of prime-age males who continued to apply for relief, a majority of 
whom were granted outdoor relief. In Manchester during the downturn of 1847/48, "out-
door relief rose and fell with a lag of about six weeks with each rise and fall in factory employ-
ment" (H. Mac Boot, "Unemployment and Poor Law Relief in Manchester, 1845-50," Social 
History, XV [1990], 217-228). See also Boyer, "Poor Relief, Informal Assistance, and Short 
Time during the Lancashire Cotton Famine," Explorations in Economic History, XXXIV (1997), 
56-76. 
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known as the poor rate, assessed on "land, houses, and buildings of 
every description" within the parish, but not on firms' profits or 
stock in trade. Machinery generally was not taken into account in 
estimating the rateable value of factory buildings. As a result of this 
system of assessment, a large share of the poor rate was levied on 
the occupiers of dwelling houses. Table i shows the distribution of 
poor-rate assessments in six Lancashire cities in 1848/49. In each 
city, the majority of collected assessments were valued at less than 
£8, and 82 percent or more of the assessments were valued at less 
than £10. An 1842 report by the assistant Poor Law commission-
ers concerning Stockport classified all assessments of £8 or less as 
working-class dwellings, and classified assessments of £8 to ^20 as 
dwellings of foremen, clerks, small shopkeepers, and "persons of 
small independent means." Assessments of more than £20 in-
cluded the "higher classes of private residences," large shopkeep-
ers, and publicans, as well as factories. Table 1 also presents the 
estimated contribution of assessments valued at less than £8 and 
£20 in the three cities for which the total value of rateable prop-
erty is known. The results suggest that assessments on working-
class dwellings contributed 14 to 29 percent of the poor rate, and 
that all assessments valued at less than ^20 contributed up to 45 
percent of the poor rate.4 
The assessment system had important implications regarding 
who paid for unemployment relief. Ratepayers can be divided 
into three groups—factory owners and other major employers of 
labor, workers, and the remaining ratepayers (merchants, shop-
keepers, landlords, tradesmen, etc.). The share of the poor rate 
paid by factory owners in Lancashire cities is not possible to deter-
mine precisely. If manufacturers paid between one-half and two-
thirds of the rate collected from assessments of £20 or more, they 
contributed 27 to 46 percent of the poor rate in these cities, "a dis-
tinctly modest contribution to local expenditure." Because the 
poor rate was levied on the occupiers of dwelling houses rather 
than the owners, workers, most of whom rented their tenements, 
4 See Rose, "The Administration of Poor Relief in the West Riding of Yorkshire c. 1820-
1855," unpub. D. Phil, thesis (Univ. of Oxford, 1965), 348-359. "Collected" assessments refer 
to paid assessments, as opposed to defaulted ones. Default rates were higher on assessments 
valued at less than jT% than on those valued at £20 or more. The Assistant Commissioners' re-
port can be found in Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Assistant Poor Law Commissioners . . . on 
the State of the Population of Stockport (1842, XXXV), 198. 
Table l Poor R a t e Assessments in Lancashire Cities, 1848/49 
% OF COLLECTED ASSESSMENTS 
VALUED AT: 
CITY 
Ashton-under--Lyne 
Blackburn 
Bol ton 
Manchester 
Oldham 
Preston 
TOTAL NUMBER 
OF ASSESSMENTS 
11,265 
7 ,272 
5,966 
37,750 
10,414 
n , 3 9 7 
LESS THAN 
84.8% 
71.6% 
68.0% 
51-5% 
80.6% 
734% 
£8 £ 2 0 OR MORE 
5.7% 
10.2% 
11.7% 
18.0% 
1.5% 
10.0% 
ESTIMATED % OF POOR RATE 
COLLECTED FROM ASSESSMENTS 
VALUED UNDER 
£8 
28.9% 
13-9% 
27.2% 
£20 
41.5% 
31.8% 
45.1% 
SOURCES Data on poor-rate assessments from Parliamentary Papers, Returns Relating to Rating of Tenements in Lancashire, Suffolk, Hampshire, and Gloucestershire 
(1849, XLVII), 10-15. Data on total value of rateable property are from Parliamentary Papers, Returns Relative to Poor Rates, County Rates, Population, &c. (1847/ 
48, LIH), 176. 
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paid part of the tax, though some of the tax levied on occupiers 
would have been shifted to their landlords. Non-labor-hiring 
middle-class taxpayers paid one-quarter or more of the poor rate. 
The more successful working-class occupiers were in shifting the 
rates on dwelling houses to their landlords, the larger was the share 
of the poor rate paid by middle-class taxpayers.5 
During most downturns, the Poor Law was capable of dealing 
with the increased demand for relief caused by unemployment. 
However, in many cities during the depression of 1841/42 and the 
Lancashire cotton famine of 1861 to 1865, the Poor Law was un-
able to meet the demand for assistance, not only because the num-
ber of unemployed workers increased but also because the 
effective tax base declined as a result of a sharp increase in the de-
fault rate of taxpayers. The use of a simple model reveals the prob-
lem faced by parishes during downturns. A parish's supply of 
poor-relief funds at a point in time t can be written as rt(l—d)tV, 
where r is the poor (tax) rate, d is the default rate, and Fis the total 
value of rateable property in the parish. Relief expenditures at 
time t are equal to gAtPy where g is the generosity of relief, 5 is the 
share of the local population being granted relief, and Pis the pop-
ulation of the parish. Setting tax revenue equal to relief expendi-
tures yields the equation rt(i ~d)tV = g£tP. Rearranging terms, the 
poor rate at time t is determined as rt = gAtP/(i—d)tV. In recession 
years, the share of the population granted relief increased, the par-
ish's value of rateable property often declined, and the default 
rate increased. In order to assist everyone who applied for relief, 
parishes were forced to increase the poor rate or reduce the gener-
osity of relief. However, increases in the poor rate tended to 
5 David Eastwood, Government and Community in the English Provinces, 1700—1870 (New 
York, 1997), 79. A detailed poor-rate assessment for Sheffield, West Yorkshire, in 1834 indi-
cates that dwelling houses paid 74.1% of the poor rate, and factories paid only 16.6%. See 
Rose, "Administration of Poor Relief," 349. Factories' contributions to the poor rate surely 
were greater in the cotton-textile district of south Lancashire in the 1840s. In 1869, Parliament 
adopted the Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act, which empowered parish vestries to 
assess the owners of dwelling houses "which do not exceed a certain prescribed limit of rate-
able value," rather than the occupiers. See G. H. Blunden, Local Taxation and Finance (Lon-
don, 1895), 27-28. The fact that Parliament felt it necessary to pass such an act suggests that 
before 1869, working-class occupiers of dwelling houses paid at least a share of the poor rate. 
There is very little information about landlords in industrial cities. Some employers built 
and owned cottages in which their workers lived, but mostly in smaller industrial towns, 
where housing was particularly scarce. In larger cities, employers probably owned only a small 
share of working-class housing, the majority of it owned by non-labor-hiring, middle-class 
taxpayers. 
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cause further increases in the default rate. There was a maximum 
beyond which parishes refused to raise the poor rate. 
Table 2 gives the particulars of each of Stockport's poor-rate 
assessments from October 1836 to June 1841. During downturns, 
as in 1838 and 1841, two or more assessments often took place per 
year. There were three assessments in 1841—in February, June, 
and November—totaling four shillings (45.) in the pound. The 25. 
assessment in November was necessary because the number of re-
lief recipients increased by 63 percent from June to December 
1841. Default rates increased sharply during the 1841 recession. In 
October 1836, a time of prosperity, 92 percent of the assessed poor 
rate was actually collected. However, as a result of the large num-
ber of defaulters, only 63 percent of the rates levied in February 
and June 1841 were collected. When Stockport collected its poor 
rate in November 1841, 1,632 of 6,180 working-class dwelling 
houses were found to be unoccupied, as were 85 shops and 11 
public houses. In addition, the occupiers of nearly 3,000 other 
dwelling houses did not pay the poor rate; upon examining 1,950 
of the defaulters, the board of guardians excused 1,134 (58 per-
cent) of them on the grounds of poverty. Most seriously, twelve of 
the town's forty factories had shut down, and could not pay their 
assessment. Under the circumstances, local officials surmised that 
another increase in the poor rate would cause more ratepayers to 
default and would yield little additional tax revenue.6 
The Role of Charity in the Depression 0/1841—1842 The inabil-
ity of the Poor Law to support all who needed assistance during 
serious downturns led to large-scale charitable efforts to assist the 
poor. In Manchester in 1841/42, local charitable organizations set 
up soup kitchens and provided bedding, clothing, and coal to the 
poor. In Stockport in 1841, a committee composed of the mayor, 
clergymen, magistrates, and "leading manufacturers" was ap-
pointed to "inquire into the state of the poor and unemployed . . . 
and to suggest means for their relief." Two months later, the com-
mittee reported that, although the poor rate had doubled, "it is 
impossible to collect sufficient [funds] to meet the current expen-
6 Details are not available for the November 1841 assessment. The precise timing of assess-
ments is difficult to explain, since it was determined, in part, by unforeseen increases in relief 
expenditures. However, boards of guardians also might have felt that during downturns two 
or three small assessments a year was less of a burden on taxpayers than one large assessment. 
Parliamentary Papers, State of the Population of Stockport (1842, XXXV), 213-216. 
Table 2 Poor-Rate Returns for Stockport, October 1836-June 1841 
AMOUNT 
DATE WHEN IN THE 
ASSESSED POUND 
O c t . 1836 15 . 3d. 
July 1837 is. gd. 
M a y 1838 0 5 . 6d. 
O c t . 1838 25 . od. 
N o v . 1839 15. 6d. 
July 1840 25 . od. 
F e b . 1841 is. od. 
June 1841 is. od. 
RATEABLE 
VALUE RATE 
£65,375.3 
66,015.3 
66,067.8 
66,098.3 
65,950.8 
65,515.0 
64,527.3 
63,184.0 
£4 ,086 .0 
5,776.3 
1,651.7 
6,609.6 
4,946.3 
6,551-5 
3,226.4 
3,159.2 
TOTAL 
ARREARS AMOUNT TO 
DUE BE COLLECTED 
£811 .0 
494.3 
648.2 
700.3 
772.7 
1,239.1 
1,848.4 
2,646.2 
£4 ,896 .9 
6,270.6 
2,299.9 
7,309.9 
5,719.0 
7,790.6 
5,074.8 
5,805.4 
AMOUNT SHARE OF 
ACTUALLY POOR RATE 
COLLECTED COLLECTED 
£3,745 .1 
4,745-6 
1,310.1 
4,787.3 
3,2454 
4,446.8 
1,837.3 
2,195.4 
0.917 
0.822 
0.793 
0.724 
O.656 
O.679 
0.569 
0.695 
AMOUNT NOT 
PRESENT RECOVERABLE 
ARREARS OR EXCUSED 
£494 .3 
648.2 
700.3 
772.7 
1,239.1 
1,848.4 
2,646.2 
2,494-5 
657.5 
876.8 
289.5 
1,749-9 
1,234-5 
1,495-4 
591.3 
1,115.5 
SOURCE Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Assistant Poor Law Commissioners . . . on the State of the Population of Stockport (1842, XXXV) , 279. 
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diture, and as small as the relief afforded is, . . . it is more than the 
resources of the rate-payers, if unaided, will continue to afford." 
The committee appealed to the public for donations, raising nearly 
£3,000 from private contributions and relieving, on average, 
3,350 families at an average cost of £34° per week for two 
months. By comparison, during the two-year period from Lady-
day (March 25) 1841 to Lady-day 1843, the Stockport union spent 
£40,670 on poor relief, or about £390 per week. Most of the 
money raised by the Stockport relief committee had been donated 
by "the wealthier inhabitants of the borough and those resident in 
the neighbourhood."7 
Stockport's need to appeal for private charity to assist the un-
employed reveals the inadequate nature of the poor-rate assess-
ment system, which did not effectively tap the new wealth created 
by industrialization. In response to the increase in the number of 
relief applicants, three poor rates were levied in 1841—all of them 
inadequate to relieve the large number of unemployed workers 
but large enough to be "a serious drain upon the diminished re-
sources of the comparatively few [individuals and firms] . . . able to 
pay them." Rather than levying another poor rate, which would 
have resulted in even more defaults, Stockport set up a relief com-
mittee in the fall of 1841 to raise funds privately. A significant 
share of the charitable contributions must have been made by mill 
owners and merchants, two groups whose wealth was relatively 
lightly taxed under the poor-rate assessment system. This approach 
was an inefficient way to tap the resources of the industrial elite; 
cities had no authority to compel manufacturers or merchants to 
make large contributions to the relief funds. Yet, cities were 
forced to proceed in this manner because of the nature of the poor 
rate.8 
Not all charitable relief was raised locally. In its report of 
1841, the Stockport relief committee stated that, because of the 
great amount of distress among the unemployed, it was "fully con-
vinced that all the efforts that can possibly be made in the town 
7 Joseph Adshead, Distress in Manchester: Evidence of the State of the Labouring Classes in 1840 
42 (London, 1842), 40-41; Parliamentary Papers, State of the Population otStockport (1842, 
XXXV), 283, 233-234; Parliamentary Papers, Average Annual Expenditure of Parishes in Unions 
in England and Wales &c. (1844, XL). 
8 Rose, "Administration of Poor Relief," 348-350; Parliamentary Papers, State of the Popu-
lation of Stockport (1842, XXXV), 285. 
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and neighbourhood will be utterly inadequate to meet the press-
ing necessities of the case." It therefore appealed for assistance "to 
those individuals and classes of society who feel little of the pres-
sure of the times." In response to similar appeals from several cit-
ies, the home secretary set up the London Manufacturers' Relief 
Committee in the spring of 1842 "to co-ordinate and regulate the 
distribution . . . of charitable funds . . . raised in England to relieve 
industrial distress." The committee contained sixty members, in-
cluding the archbishops of Canterbury and York. It received 
slightly more than -£100,000 in donations. Three-quarters of the 
funds raised were in response to a letter from Queen Victoria, 
which was read in English churches in July, appealing for aid for 
the unemployed. The other £24,600 was raised by subscription, 
presumably from wealthy individuals. The committee granted re-
lief to localities that requested it, provided that they had already 
organized a local committee consisting of "magistrates, clergy, and 
principle inhabitants," and that local subscriptions had already 
been raised for relief of the poor. The committee required that the 
major part of the relief be granted to able-bodied men and their 
families, that at least one-half of the relief be given in kind, and 
that work be required from able-bodied men in return for relief. It 
made a grant of £5 00 to the Stockport relief committee.9 
Poor Relief and Charity during the Downturns 0/1847/48 and 1858 
The downturns of 1847/48 and 1858 were not as severe as the 
depression of 1841/42, although some cities experienced high un-
employment, especially in 1847/48. Unemployment in Manches-
ter cotton mills during the first six months of 1848 averaged 18.6 
percent, and another 9.5 percent of factory workers were on short 
time. Numbers receiving poor relief, and relief expenditures, in-
creased sharply in 1847/48. From the winter of 1845/46 to the 
winter of 1847/48, the number of relief recipients more than tri-
pled in Manchester and nearly doubled in Bradford. During the 
same period, relief expenditures increased by 86 percent in Man-
9 Parliamentary Papers, State of the Population of Stockport (1842, XXXV), 217; Smout, 
"Strange Intervention of Edward Twistleton," 253; Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select 
Committee on Distress (Paisley) (1843, VII), 3-4. The recipient of the most aid from the London 
relief committee was the Scottish city of Paisley, which was granted ^15,081 between May 
1842 and February 1843, due to the severity of its depression and the fact that under the Scot-
tish Poor Law, able-bodied workers were not eligible for poor relief even when unemployed. 
See Smout, "Strange Intervention of Edward Twistleton;" R. A. Cage, The Scottish Poor Law 
1745-1845 (Edinburgh, 1981), 10-15. 
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Chester, 121 percent in Bradford, and 78 percent in Leeds. That 
the downturn of 1858 is barely perceptible in the Poor Law statis-
tics—the total number of relief recipients in England and Wales 
increasing by less than 3 percent from 1857 to 1858—is not sur-
prising, given that it was shorter and less severe than either of the 
slumps of the 1840s.10 
The extent of charitable assistance for the unemployed during 
the 1847/48 and 1858 downturns is more difficult to measure. 
Manchester charities raised approximately £19,000 in 1848 from 
subscriptions, donations, collections, etc., but how much of this 
money went to aid the unemployed is not clear. In Leeds, the un-
employed received assistance from the Benevolent or Strangers' 
Friend Society and from an ad hoc relief fund. The contribution 
from private charity from 1847 to 1849 was much smaller than it 
had been in 1842; the relief funds collected in 1847 and 1849, 
combined, totaled £3,500, half of the amount collected in 1842. A 
soup kitchen relieved 15,000 persons in April 1848. There is little 
evidence of large-scale charitable relief funds during the 1858 
downturn. Glasgow, which provided assistance to 10,051 families 
during the winter of 1857/58, may have had the largest emergency 
fund.11 
The downturns of 1847/78 and 1858 did not create wide-
spread relief crises as the 1841/42 depression had done. In most 
cities, emergency charitable funds were unnecessary because the 
Poor Law was able to handle relief of the unemployed. However, 
the government did nothing during this period to fix the defects of 
10 Unemployment data were obtained from The Economist, weekly issues from January 8 to 
July i, 1848. See also Sidney Pollard, "Labour in Great Britain," in Peter Mathias and Michael 
M. Postan (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. VII. The Industrial Economies: Capi 
tal, Labour, and Enterprise (Cambridge, 1978), 126-127. Data about the number of relief recipi-
ents for the half-year ending Lady Day (March 25) are from Parliamentary Papers, Return of the 
Comparative Expenditure for the Relief of the Poor, [and\ the Comparative Number of Poor Relieved, 
. . . in the Six Months ending Lady day in 1846, 1847, and 1848 (1847/48, LIII), 185. Data about 
relief expenditures are from Boyer, An Economic History of the English Poor Law, 1750 1850 
(Cambridge, 1990), 238; Karel Williams, From Pauperism to Poverty (London, 1981), 158. 
11 Peter Shapely, Charity and Power in Victorian Manchester (Manchester, 2000), 38, gives the 
sources of income for nine Manchester charities in 1848. Kidd, "Charity Organization," 47-
48, contends that the activities of Manchester charities—the Manchester and Salford District 
Provident Society in particular—declined in the 1840s and 1850s. Robert Morris, Class, Sect, 
and Party: The Making of the British Middle Class, Leeds 1820 1850 (Manchester, 1990), 302-303; 
John F. C. Harrison, Early Victorian Britain, 1832—51 (London, 1988), 57; Beveridge, Unemploy-
ment, 66. 
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the poor-rate assessment system, bringing the problems associated 
with the Poor Law to a head in Lancashire cities a few years later. 
Poor Relief and Charity during the Lancashire Cotton Famine 
During the American Civil War of 1861 to 1865, raw cotton 
imports to Britain declined sharply, forcing Lancashire cotton fac-
tories to curtail production severely or shut down. At the peak of 
the cotton famine, in December 1862, 266,500 persons were re-
ceiving poor relief in twenty-three distressed Poor Law unions, 
out of a population of 1,870,600. An additional 200,000 to 236,000 
persons received relief from charitable funds. In total, 25 to 27 per-
cent of the population of the distressed region obtained help 
through either public or private sources. In several Poor Law un-
ions, more than one-third of the population must have received 
some form of assistance at the peak of the famine. Some of the 
persons receiving poor relief also benefited simultaneously from 
charitable funds; the total number of persons receiving relief from 
charitable funds during the winter of 1862/63 was almost certainly 
more than 300,000 and possibly more than 3 50,000.12 
In the early months of the famine, numbers on relief in-
creased rapidly in several Poor Law unions, and the relief roles 
continued to grow throughout the summer and fall of 1862 (see 
Table 3). As had occurred in 1842, the increased demand for relief 
and the large number of defaults on poor-rate assessments caused 
several Poor Law unions to run into serious financial problems. 
Blackburn, Rochdale, Preston, and Ashton formed private-relief 
committees early in 1862, and most of the other towns in the dis-
tressed area soon followed suit.13 
In the spring of 1862, Lancashire officials began to appeal to 
the rest of Britain for help. A group of London merchants associ-
ated with the cotton industry convinced the Lord Mayor of Lon-
don to form the Lancashire and Cheshire Operatives Relief Fund 
(or Mansion House Fund). From May 1862 to June 1865, the fund 
contributed £528,336 to the distressed cotton districts. Another 
relief fund, the Bridge water Fund, emerged in London, eventually 
12 John Watts, The Facts of the Cotton Famine (London, 1866), 120; R. Arthur Arnold, The 
History of the Cotton Famine (London, 1865), 191. The central relief committee of Manchester 
estimated that in January 1863, 235,741 persons were relieved by private relief committees 
only, and that an additional 138,889 were relieved both by the Poor Law guardians and the 
local committees—the total number of persons receiving private relief being 374,630 (cited in 
the Journal of the Statistical Society of London, XXVII [1864], 600). 
13 William O. Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine 1861-1865 (Manchester, 1934), 74. 
Table 3 Percentage of Populat ion Rece iv ing Poor Relief in T e n Distressed Poor -Law Un ions dur ing the C o t t o n Famine , September 
1861-November 1862 
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION RECEIVING POOR RELIEF % CHANGE IN 
NUM BER ON RELIEF 
POOR LAW UNION 
Ashton-under -Lyne 
Blackburn 
Burnley 
Bury 
Manchester 
O ldham 
Preston 
Rochda le 
Salford 
Stockport 
SEPTEMBER 
1861 
1.3 
2.3 
1.8 
i-9 
3-4 
1.6 
2.9 
2.2 
2.5 
1.6 
FEBRUARY 
1862 
34 
7-7 
3-3 
3-7 
6.4 
2.6 
10.5 
4.5 
4.1 
4.8 
JUNE 
1862 
7-1 
9.6 
4-5 
3-8 
7-7 
2.8 
11.0 
4.8 
4 4 
6.4 
SEPTEMBER 
1862 
15.2 
H.7 
8.8 
7.6 
I I . 7 
6.5 
15-3 
9.8 
6.4 
10.2 
NOVEMBER 
1862 
25.6 
20. 0 
I I . 2 
I I . 7 
21.1 
14.2 
21.0 
15.2 
IO.9 
13.0 
SEPT. ][86I-JU 
443.6 
313.3 
H3.3 
98.4 
125.7 
73-3 
275.7 
120.2 
794 
306.1 
SOURCES Data on the number of relief recipients are from Parliamentary Papers, Return of the Number of Paupers . . . in Receipt of Relief in Each Week of the Four 
teen Months Ending with December 1858, 1861, and 1862, Respectively (1862, XLIX, Pt. 1), 122-177; Parliamentary Papers, Return . . . and Summary of the Number of 
Paupers Relieved . . . in Each Week of the Twenty two Months Ending with August 1863 (1863, LII), 182-192. 
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raising £52,000 for the relief of Lancashire. Soon after the initia-
tion of the Mansion House Fund, the (Manchester) Central Relief 
Committee was formally established; it included the mayors and 
ex-mayors of the principal towns of the cotton district and a num-
ber of gentlemen associated with the commercial interests of Man-
chester. One of its first acts was to draft a resolution directed at city 
and county officials throughout Britain, requesting aid for the 
families of distressed workers connected with the cotton trade. 
The money raised by the two London relief committees went to 
either the Central Relief Committee in Manchester or the indi-
vidual local committees for distribution.14 
The total amount expended by public and private sources for 
poor relief in Lancashire from March 1861 to March 1864 was 
about £3,530,400. Poor-relief expenditures equaled £1,937,920, 
or 54.9 percent of the total; charity accounted for the remaining 
45.1 percent. Of the charitable funds raised, £786,400 (22.3 per-
cent) came from the cotton districts; the remaining £806,000 
came from elsewhere in Britain or overseas. Altogether, slightly 
more than three-quarters of expenditures came from local sources. 
If manufacturers and other large employers of labor paid 40 per-
cent of the poor rate, and contributed half of the charitable funds 
raised within the distressed area, they would have paid one-third 
of the amount spent on public and private relief during the famine. 
In addition to their contributions to charitable funds, some manu-
facturers "gave their 'hands' daily meals and established soup 
kitchens," and those who owned cottages in which their workers 
lived generally did not collect rent during the famine. Manufac-
turers paid, at most, 40 percent of the cost of relieving the unem-
ployed, even counting the value of rents excused and meals given 
to workers.15 
There was some friction between the authorities in the cot-
ton districts and the London relief committees, as well as between 
the central executive committee in Manchester and the local 
boards of guardians and relief committees. The administrators of 
14 Watts, Facts of the Cotton Famine, 160-161; Henderson, Lancashire Cotton Famine, 79; 
Arnold, History of the Cotton Famine, 82-83. 
15 Thomas MacKay, A History of the English Poor Law (London, 1899), III, 416. The charita-
ble contributions from the cotton district included £289,000 raised by the local relief com-
mittees, £276,500 raised by the central relief committee of Lancashire or the London relief 
committees, and £220,000 locally distributed outside of the local committees and the central 
committee. Arnold, History of the Cotton Famine, i n. 
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the London committees, anxious that the funds that they raised 
should "relieve the destitute and not the ratepayers," complained 
that the local boards of guardians were not spending enough on 
poor relief. Before making a grant to a local relief committee, the 
central executive committee required information about the local-
ity's expenditures on poor relief, the amount of charitable funds 
collected by the local committee, the number of unemployed 
operatives in the town, the number relieved by the guardians 
and the local committee, and the generosity of public and private 
relief16 
In the summer of 1862, when the resources of both the local 
boards of guardians and the relief committees began to be strained, 
Parliament intervened to ease the financial burdens of the dis-
tressed areas. The Union Relief Aid Act of 1862 had three major 
provisions. First, if the poor rate of any parish in the distressed area 
exceeded 35. in the pound, the excess should be charged to the 
other parishes in the Poor Law union. Second, if the aggregate 
poor rate for a union exceeded 55. in the pound, the Poor Law 
Board could order other unions in the county to contribute 
money to meet the excess. Third, if the aggregate rate for a union 
exceeded 35. in the pound, it could apply to the Poor Law Board 
to borrow the excess, to be repaid within seven years. The first 
provision effectively shifted part of the cost of relieving the unem-
ployed from working-class parishes to wealthier parishes in the 
same Poor Law union.17 
In 1863, Parliament adopted a second law to aid the distressed 
areas—the Public Works (Manufacturing Districts) Bill—which 
allowed local boards of guardians to borrow money from the 
national government for thirty years at an interest rate of 3.5 per-
cent. The money was to be used for public-works projects using 
the labor of unemployed cotton operatives, who were to be hired 
16 Arnold, History of the Cotton Famine, 150-152; Watts, Facts of the Cotton Famine, 190; 
Henderson, Lancashire Cotton Famine, 76—77. 
17 MacKay, English Poor Law, 395-396. The extent of this cost shift to wealthier parishes 
was large in some unions. For the half-year ending Lady Day 1863, in Ashton-under-Lyne, 
82.9% of relief expenditures were charged to the union common fund, and only 17.1% to the 
individual parishes. In Stockport, Rochdale, Preston and Blackburn, two-thirds or more of 
relief expenditures were charged to the union (Parliamentary Papers, Sixteenth Annual Report 
of the Poor Law Board, 1863-64 [1864, XXXV], 330). The principle of shifting the responsibility 
for paupers from the parish to the Poor Law union was made permanent in 1865. See Mary 
MacKinnon, "English Poor Law Policy and the Crusade against Outrelief," Journal of Economic 
History, XLVII (1987), 603-625. Watts, Facts of the Cotton Famine, 291-293. 
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to do unskilled manual labor and paid the going wage for unskilled 
workers. From 1863 to 1865, ninety local authorities borrowed 
£1.85 million to construct public works. Although many bene-
ficial projects were undertaken, the Act was a failure as an employ-
ment project. Rather than create so many as 30,000 jobs for 
unemployed operatives, as its sponsors expected, peak employ-
ment on public works was 6,424 in October 1864, only 4,990 of 
whom were cotton operatives.18 
From 1834 to 1865, unemployment relief was financed by a 
combination of public and private sources. The Poor Law usually 
proved capable of relieving the unemployed. During major down-
turns, however, voluntary organizations had to raise money, and 
localities sometimes had to appeal elsewhere for help—as in 1842 
and 1862, when national charities were established to solicit funds 
throughout England for the support of unemployed workers in in-
dustrial cities. 
Generosity of Relief, 1834—1870 Throughout this period, 
boards of guardians and relief committees tried to set the generos-
ity of relief benefits at a level high enough to ensure that unem-
ployed workers and their families would be able to subsist in good 
health, but low enough that the incentive to work would not be 
lost. The level of benefits given to an unemployed worker was de-
termined by family size and by the income, if any, that other fam-
ily members were earning. Benefit levels were remarkably similar 
across towns and over time; guardians typically granted 25. to 35. 
to a single adult male per week, and 15. 6d. to 25. 6d. per week for 
each additional family member. The benefits were smaller if the 
applicant's family had other sources of income. For example, in 
1841, Bolton guardians granted applicants enough relief to make 
up their income "to 2s. 3d. per head per week . . . where we 
clearly ascertain the amount [the family] earned."19 
18 MacKay, English Poor Law, 398-404; Henderson, Lancashire Cotton Famine, 61-63. The 
public works undertaken in 1863-1865 were not criticized for their "pauperizing" effects on 
workers nearly so strongly as were later work-relief projects. Robert Rawlinson, admittedly 
not a neutral observer, wrote that the workers' conduct was "exceedingly good." However, 
Charles Trevelyan concluded that the mixing of labor and charity associated with the public-
works projects engendered "great abuse and demoralisation" (quotations from Henderson, 
Lancashire Cotton Famine, 63, 66). 
19 Rose, "Administration of Poor Relief," 195-196; Parliamentary Papers, A Copy of Re-
ports Received by the PoorLaw Commissioners in 1841, on the State of the Macclesfield and Bolton Un 
ions (1846, XXXVI), 12-13. 
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When downturns became exceptionally severe, boards of 
guardians or relief committees often were forced by lack of funds 
to reduce relief generosity. During the cotton famine, officials 
who typically tried to maintain relief benefits at about 25. per per-
son per week were forced to reduce benefits to less than 15. 6d. per 
person. The guardians realized that the relief that they were grant-
ing was inadequate and "assumed that this meagre sum would be 
augmented from other sources," including charitable aid. Their 
assumption appears to have been correct. An estimate of 1863 sug-
gests that over 60 percent of individuals receiving outdoor relief 
from the guardians also received assistance from the local commit-
tees. In combination, poor relief and private charity were able to 
maintain the generosity of relief at about its pre-famine level. 
George Buchanan reported at the peak of distress in 1862 that 
"taking the great mass of the cotton workers with their families as 
a whole, their average income . . . from all sources is nearly 2s. per 
head per week. This is exclusive of clothing, bedding and firing 
which are now usually supplied in addition."20 
Modern studies of relief generosity tend to focus on the rela-
tionship between benefits and wages. During the cotton famine, 
the central executive committee in Manchester strove to maintain 
an average benefit/wage ratio of about one-third. However, be-
cause an unemployed individual's benefits were tied to the size of 
his family rather than to his wage, the benefit/wage ratio tended 
to vary. If applicants for assistance in both periods received 25. per 
family member per week in public and private relief, an unem-
ployed class 3 spinner with a wife and two children would have 
had a benefit/wage ratio of 48.5 percent in 1841/42. For a class 1 
spinner, the benefit/wage ratio would have been 20 percent. In 
1862/63, an unemployed class 3 spinner from a family of four 
20 L. Lynne Kiesling, "Institutional Choice Matters: The Poor Law and Implicit Labor 
Contracts in Victorian Lancashire," Explorations in Economic History, XXXIII (1996), 83; Rose, 
"Rochdale Man and the Stalybridge Riot: The Relief and Control of the Unemployed dur-
ing the Lancashire Cotton Famine," in A. P. Donajgrodzki (ed.), Social Control in Nineteenth 
Century Britain (London, 1977), 189; Journal of the Statistical Society of London, XXVII (1864), 
600. The Buchanan quotation is from Henderson, Lancashire Cotton Famine, 99. The Manual 
for the Guidance of Local Relief Committees in the Cotton Districts Arising out of the Experience of 
1862-63 stated, "The Scale of Relief which has obtained the approval of the Central Executive 
Committee is one which provides, on the average, two shillings per head for the whole mass 
of recipients; to which may be added, in winter, supply of fuel and clothing, if the family have 
been long out of work" (Henderson, Lancashire Cotton Famine, 100). 
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would have had a replacement rate of 37 percent; for a class 1 spin-
ner, the replacement rate was 20 percent.21 
The Crisis of the 1860s in London The Lancashire cotton fam-
ine was not the only poor relief crisis of the 1860s. Rose contends 
that during the decade, "the English poor relief system was sub-
jected to an almost continual series of shocks which exposed its 
basic weakness." London was especially hard hit. In the winter of 
1860/61, the Thames froze, causing a decline in all outdoor work 
and the complete cessation of riverside employment for several 
weeks. The resulting flood of applications for relief created severe 
problems in several east London Poor Law unions. As in the 
northern industrial cities, the poor-relief crisis led to a large in-
crease in private charitable expenditures—approximately £40,000 
being raised by various charities.22 
The London Poor Law suffered an even larger shock from 
1866 to 1869, when the combination of a business-cycle down-
turn, the decline of the London shipbuilding industry, and severe 
winter weather greatly increased the demand for poor relief. Once 
again, the East End suffered the worst blow. In Poplar, the number 
of paupers relieved in late December 1867 w a s x78 percent greater 
than the number relieved at the same time in 1865. The strain on 
the East End Poor Law Unions was enormous. Most middle-class 
ratepayers already had moved out of the area, driving down the 
tax base. As a result, poor rates were high even during normal 
years; in the late 1860s, they increased to more than 3.55. in the 
pound in Bethnal Green, Stepney, and elsewhere. In several East 
End districts, as many as one-third of taxpayers were unable to pay 
their poor rates. Local guardians were forced to turn to private 
charities for assistance. Charitable aid poured in from London's 
wealthier districts. The indiscriminate nature of charitable relief 
21 Rose, "Rochdale Man," 191. In 1841, the average weekly wage of Lancashire cotton 
spinners was 21s. 8d; wages ranged from 405. for a class 1 spinner to 165. 6d. for a class 3 spin-
ner. In 1861, the average wage of cotton spinners was 24s. 4^.; wages ranged from 395. 6d. for 
a class 1 spinner to 21s. 6d. for a class 3 spinner. Wage data are from George H. Wood, The 
History of Wages in the Cotton Trade during the Past Hundred Years (London, 1910), 28. 
22 Rose, "Crisis of Poor Relief," 54. An east London minister wrote in late January 1861, 
"the history of the last month shows that the Poor Law has broken down, that it is utterly in-
competent under its present constitution to relieve the London poor" (David R. Green, From 
Artisans to Paupers: Economic Change and Poverty in London, lygo—iSyo [Aldershot, 1995], 234). 
For a description of east London's poor in January 1861, see John Hollingshead, Ragged Lon-
don in 1861 (London, 1861), 39-97. Beveridge, Unemployment, 157. 
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appalled many middle-class observers. John R. Green, a vicar in 
Stepny, wrote in 1868 that "some half a million of people in the 
East End of London have been flung into the crucible of public 
benevolence, and have come out of it simply paupers. . . . The 
very clergy who were foremost in the work of relief last year stand 
aghast at the pauper Frankenstein they have created."23 
The breakdown of the Poor Law in the 1860s, together with 
the unsystematic nature of charitable aid, convinced many that the 
system of poor relief required a "radical restructuring" to restrict 
the provision of outdoor relief and to regulate the provision of pri-
vate charity severely, thus to restore self-help among the poor. In 
the decade that followed, major changes in the Poor Law sig-
nificantly altered the form of public assistance for unemployed 
workers. 
UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF, 1 8 7 O - I 9 I I 
The Crusade Against Outrelief The early 1870s represent a 
watershed in the history of unemployment relief. Encouraged by 
the newly formed Local Government Board (LGB), Poor Law 
unions throughout England and Wales sharply limited outdoor re-
lief for all types of paupers—in particular, able-bodied males. This 
change in policy, known as the Crusade Against Outrelief, was a 
joint consequence of the Poor Law crisis of the 1860s, a change in 
middle-class attitudes toward poverty, and new methods to 
finance the Poor Law.24 
In the aftermath of east London's Poor Law crisis from 1866 
to 1869, George Goschen, President of the Poor Law Board, is-
sued a Minute to Poor Law officials in the metropolis, criticizing 
the granting of outdoor relief to the able-bodied and calling for 
greater coordination of relief efforts between the Poor Law and 
private charity. Two years later, the LGB issued a circular stating 
that the increase in expenditures on outdoor relief during the 
1860s was "so great, as to excite apprehension," and concluded 
23 Green, From Artisans to Paupers, 235, 231-241; Jones, Outcast London, 249-251. 
J. R. Green's quotation is given in Helen Bonsanquet, Social Work in London, 1869-1912: 
A History of the Charity Organisation Society (London, 1914), 13-14. 
24 The Crusade Against Outrelief is discussed in MacKinnon, "English Poor Law Policy"; 
Robert Humphreys, Sin, Organized Charity and the Poor Law in Victorian England (New York, 
1995)-
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that generous outdoor relief was destroying self-reliance among 
the poor. In the circular's words, "a certainty of obtaining outdoor 
relief in his own home whenever he may ask for it extinguishes in 
the mind of the labourer all motive for husbanding his resources, 
and induces him to rely exclusively upon the rates instead of upon 
his own savings for such relief as he may require."25 
The government was not alone in its condemnation of gener-
ous poor relief. Beatrice Webb wrote that during the 1860s and 
1870s, the upper classes became obsessed that "the mass-misery of 
great cities arose mainly, if not entirely, from spasmodic, indis-
criminate and unconditional doles, whether in the form of alms or 
in that of Poor Law relief." Mid-Victorian Britain saw the rise of 
an ethic of respectability and self-help, preached by such middle-
class reformers as Smiles, who wrote that working men could be 
independent if they practiced industry and thrift; it was "the duty 
of the prudent man" to set aside money to provide for unemploy-
ment and sickness. Smiles' views were echoed by the Charity Or-
ganization Society (cos), founded in 1869, partly in response to 
the indiscriminate nature of Londoners' recent charitable giving. 
The cos maintained that even most low-skilled workers earned 
enough to set aside income in anticipation of future interruptions 
in earnings. The failure of workers to save was caused, to a large 
extent, by the easy availability of generous outdoor relief; thus 
would the restriction of outdoor relief improve the moral and 
economic condition of the poor in the long run. Unregulated 
charity had a similar effect on the poor. An early leader of the cos 
wrote that "indiscriminate charity is one of the curses of Lon-
don. . . . The effect of this charity is that. . . the people never learn 
to work or to save."26 
The third catalyst of the Crusade Against Outrelief was Par-
liament's passage of the Union Chargeability Act in 1865, and sim-
ilar acts relating to London in 1867, 1869, and 1870. The Union 
Chargeability Act placed the entire cost of poor relief on the Poor 
Law union rather than on each parish within it. The adoption of 
25 The texts of Goschen's 1869 Minute and the LGB'S 1871 Circular can be found in Rose, 
The English Poor Law, 1780-igjo (Newton Abbot, 1971), 226-230. 
26 Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship (London, 1926), 200; Samuel Smiles, Self-Help: With 
Illustrations of Character, Conduct, and Perseverance (Oxford, 2002; orig. pub. 1866), 242-260; 
MacKinnon, "English Poor Law Policy," 606-607; Henrietta Barnett, Canon Barnett, His Life, 
Works, and Friends (London, 1919), I, 83. 
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union rating shifted a large share of the cost of relief from work-
ing-class parishes (which had many paupers and a low tax base) to 
middle-class parishes (which had fewer paupers and a higher tax 
base). The infusion of money from wealthier parishes eased the 
financial burdens that had plagued the Poor Law, and enabled un-
ions to construct new, and larger, workhouses. The tax-rate in-
crease in the wealthier parishes also sparked a reconsideration of 
poor relief. Boards of guardians typically were dominated by 
members from the wealthier parishes, who responded to the in-
crease in their taxes by looking for ways to reduce the cost of re-
lief. Their search led them to the cos, which claimed that since 
the vast majority of applicants for relief would refuse to enter 
workhouses, a shift from outdoor relief to relief in workhouses 
would significantly reduce relief expenditures.27 
Boards of guardians throughout England accepted the cos' 
claims that the restriction of outdoor relief would both improve 
the morality of the poor and reduce the cost of relief. Webb wrote 
that behind the cos' "array of inductive and deductive proof of 
the disastrous effect on the wage-earning class of any kind of sub-
vention, there lay the subconscious bias of'the Haves' against tax-
ing themselves for 'the Have Nots. '" Thus, "it is not surprising 
that the . . . tenets of the originators of the idea of charity organisa-
tion found ready acceptance among the enlightened members of 
the propertied class."28 
One of the aims of the Crusade Against Outrelief was to 
make reliance on the Poor Law during times of "personal distress" 
an unpalatable option for workers. In this regard, it was a great 
success. Workers who once viewed outdoor relief as a right began 
to attach a strong stigma to entering workhouses. The share of the 
population receiving poor relief declined almost continuously 
from 1870 to 1913. Skilled workers largely accepted the Victorian 
ethic of self-help, protecting themselves against income loss by 
saving money and by joining trade unions and friendly societies. 
Trade unions became a major source of unemployment benefits 
for skilled workers, who became much less likely to turn to local 
authorities or charitable institutions for assistance. On the other 
27 Expenditures on workhouse construction increased sharply after the adoption of the Un-
ion Chargeability Act. See Williams, From Pauperism to Poverty, 218-219. MacKinnon, "Eng-
lish Poor Law Policy," 607-608. 
28 Webb, My Apprenticeship, 201. 
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hand, unemployed low-skilled workers continued to rely on pub-
lic and private assistance, but typically not poor relief. Proper 
study of unemployment relief during this period requires looking 
at skilled and unskilled workers separately. 
Trade Union Unemployment Benefits Although certain craft 
unions had started to provide their members with "friendly 
benefits" early in the nineteenth century, the adoption of mutual 
insurance policies increased sharply during the third quarter of the 
century. Unemployment benefits were the most important of the 
union benefits, because they represented "a service which must, in 
their absence, remain unperformed." Private mutual-help associa-
tions, known as friendly societies, offered sickness, old-age, and 
funeral benefits, but not unemployment insurance. Workers anx-
ious to insure themselves against unemployment could do so only 
through a trade union.29 
In 1893, 744,000 trade union members (59 percent of the to-
tal) were eligible for unemployment benefits; by 1908, 1,474,000 
workers were eligible for them—66 percent of all union members 
but only 12 percent of the adult male workforce. The availability 
and duration of unemployment benefits differed markedly by oc-
cupation. In 1911, virtually all union members in the metal, engi-
neering, shipbuilding, and printing trades were entitled to 
unemployment benefits, compared with 67 percent in the build-
ing trades, 59 percent in cotton, 38 percent in mining, and only 
5 percent in laborers' unions.30 
29 Webb and Webb, Industrial Democracy (London, 1897), 160-161. In 1901, 4.14 million 
persons belonged to friendly societies providing sickness insurance. See Johnson, Saving and 
Spending, 57. However, only 28,000 persons belonged to societies providing unemployment 
insurance (Harris, Unemployment and Politics, 295). For an explanation of why friendly societies 
did not offer unemployment insurance, see Boyer, "What Did Unions Do in Nineteenth 
Century Britain?" Journal of Economic History, XLVIII (1988), 319-332. 
30 Data for 1893 are from Board of Trade, Seventh Annual Report on Trade Unions (London, 
1895). Data for 1908 are from Board of Trade, Report on Trade Unions in 1908—10 (London, 
1912). Data on union membership and the adult male workforce in 1908 are from George S. 
Bain and Robert Price, Profiles of Union Growth: A Comparative Statistical Portrait of Eight Coun 
tries (Oxford, 1980), 37. In mining and cotton, the numbers cited are for the share of workers 
entitled to benefits because of "bad trade" or mill stoppages; a larger percentage of workers 
were eligible for benefits if they were unemployed due to fires, breakdowns of machinery, 
etc. Unemployment benefits largely were unnecessary in coal mining and cotton textiles be-
cause of the widespread use of short time and sliding wage scales, which resulted in relatively 
few layoffs during cyclical downturns. Unions of low-skilled workers did not provide unem-
ployment benefits because the irregularity of employment in most low-skilled occupations 
raised the cost of insurance substantially above the weekly premium paid by skilled workers 
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Union-provided unemployment insurance was financed by 
members' weekly contributions. The typical union member paid 
6d. to 15. per week in dues. Although no unions maintained sepa-
rate unemployment insurance funds, it is possible to estimate the 
cost of unemployment insurance by calculating individual unions' 
average annual expenditure per member on unemployment 
benefits. Such a calculation for three major unions—the Amal-
gamated Society of Engineers, the Amalgamated Carpenters and 
Joiners, and the London Compositors—from 1870 to 1896 yields 
average annual expenditures on unemployment benefits per mem-
ber of 22.35., 15.35., and 16.45., respectively, or 3.5^. to 5.id. per 
member per week. Adding a small amount for administrative costs 
brings the cost to insure a skilled worker against unemployment 
to \d. to 6d. per week, which was 1 to 2 percent of his weekly 
income.31 
The Board of Trade reported the total expenditures on un-
employment benefits of 100 principal trade unions for the years 
1892 to 1910. Annual expenditures varied from a low of ^184,600 
in 1899 to a high of £1,004,685 in 1908; the average annual ex-
penditure was £468,500. The Labour Department estimated that 
all trade unions in Britain spent a total of £1,257,913 on unem-
ployment benefits in 1908. In other words, the 100 principal un-
ions accounted for 80 percent of the total expenditure. If that ratio 
held throughout the period from 1892 to 1910, the average annual 
expenditure on unemployment benefits by all trade unions 
amounted to £585,6oo.32 
The generosity and the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefits differed significantly from union to union. In 1892, the 
average weekly benefit was about 105. per week, at least for the 
first twelve to fourteen weeks of unemployment. The Amalgam-
ated Engineers paid an unemployed member 105. per week for the 
first fourteen weeks of unemployment, then 75. per week for 
the next thirty weeks, and 6s. per week for another sixty weeks. 
and above what the unskilled could afford to pay. See Boyer, "What Did Unions Do?" 324— 
328; Beveridge, Unemployment, 220-1; J. H. Porter, "Wage Bargaining under Conciliation 
Agreements, 1860-1914," Economic History Review, XXIII (1970), 466—475. 
31 Data on trade unions' annual expenditures per worker on unemployment benefits are 
from George H. Wood, "Trade Union Expenditure on Unemployment Benefits since i860," 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, LXIII (1900), 83-86. 
32 Board of Trade, Report on Trade Unions in 1908—10, lxxv. 
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The Amalgamated Carpenters and Joiners paid ios. a week for the 
first twelve weeks of unemployment and then 6s. a week for the 
next twelve weeks. The maximum duration of benefits was 
twenty-four weeks. The Amalgamated Smiths and Strikers paid 
65. per week for a maximum of eight weeks.33 
Aggregate data on generosity and duration of unemployment 
benefits for 1908 are presented in Table 4. The maximum weekly 
benefit was between 95. 3d. and 105. for 42 percent of workers, 
and between 85. 3 d. and 105. for 55 percent of workers. On aver-
age, weekly unemployment benefits in 1908 were about equal to 
their level in 1892. The maximum duration of benefits varied 
widely—fifty-two weeks or longer for 48 percent of workers in 
metals and 41 percent of workers in mining, but only nineteen to 
twenty-five weeks for the majority of workers in the building 
trades, and thirteen weeks or less for the majority of workers in 
textiles. 
The maximum replacement rate for carpenters was, on aver-
age, 29 percent in 1892 and 26 percent in 1908. For fitters, the 
maximum replacement rate was, on average, 30 percent in 1892 
and 28 percent in 1908. These replacement rates were relatively 
small, and they declined even further with time. A member of the 
Amalgamated Engineers who was unemployed for more than 
fourteen weeks in 1892 would see his replacement rate fall to 21 
percent; if he were unemployed for more than forty-four weeks, 
his replacement rate would fall to 18 percent. Similarly, a member 
of the Amalgamated Carpenters and Joiners who was unemployed 
for more than twelve weeks would see his replacement rate fall to 
18 percent; if he were unemployed for more than twenty-four 
weeks, his benefits would fall to zero.34 
33 Parliamentary Papers, Royal Commission on Labour: Rules and Associations of Employers and 
of Employed (1892, XXXVI), 31-32, 45-46, 157-158. 
34 Wage data for carpenters and fitters in 1892 are from Board of Trade, Rates of Wages and 
Hours of Labour in Various Industries in the United Kingdom, unpub. report (London, 1908). 
Wage data for carpenters and fitters in 1908 are from Board of Trade, Twelfth Abstract of Labour 
Statistics of the United Kingdom, igo6~y (London, 1908), 40-42. SouthalTs analysis of unem-
ployment among the Amalgamated Engineers from i860 to 1872 suggests that during down-
turns (1863, 1869), around 15% of the unemployed had been out of work for over nine 
months, and more than 40% had been out of work for at least six months. See Humphrey 
Southall, "The Economics of Mutuality: An Analysis of Trade Union Welfare Systems in 19th 
Century Britain," unpub. ms. (London, 1998), 27. Beveridge, Unemployment, 19, maintained 
that most unions set the maximum duration of benefits high enough that even during serious 
downturns, only a small share of their unemployed members ever exhausted their benefits. 
Table 4 Unemployment Benefits Paid by Trade Unions, 1908 
125. 3 d. and higher 
105. 3d. to 125. 
95. 3 d. to 105. 
85. 3 d. to 95. 
75. 3 d. to 85. 
55. 3 d. to 75. 
55. and lower 
Not ascertainable 
Union members 
52 weeks or more 
39-51 weeks 
27-38 weeks 
26 weeks 
19-25 weeks 
14-18 weeks 
12-13 weeks 
7—11 weeks 
6 weeks or fewer 
Not ascertainable 
Union members 
BUILDING TRADES 
(21 UNIONS) 
MAXIMUM WEEKLY 
0.0 
0.1 
70 .8 
25 .6 
0.1 
0.7 
0.4 
2.2 
9 5 , 0 7 7 
MAXIMUM DURATION 
0.0 
0. 0 
0.0 
0.1 
57-7 
0.0 
3-0 
36.4 
0.7 
2.2 
9 5 , 0 7 7 
MINING AND 
QUARRYING 
(46 UNIONS) 
BENEFITS (PERCENT 
0.3 
9 4 
60.5 
20.0 
0.7 
0.3 
2.0 
7.0 
392 ,542 
METAL, ENGINEERING, 
AND SHIPBUILDING 
(166 UNIONS) 
DISTRIBUTION OF UNION 
0.9 
2.3 
50.4 
9-3 
5.8 
1.2 
27.8 
2.3 
2 9 3 , 6 6 6 
TEXTILE TRADES 
(212 UNIONS) 
MEMBERS) 
13.2 
4-5 
17.9 
14.0 
10.3 
20.3 
17.2 
2.6 
3io,499 
OF BENEFITS (PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF UNION MEMBERS) 
41 .0 
0.4 
9.0 
0-9 
3.1 
0.2 
8.9 
23.5 
6.1 
7.0 
392 ,542 
48 .4 
2.6 
7-9 
8.1 
7. 8 
17 4 
3.0 
1.8 
1.2 
2.0 
2 9 3 , 6 6 6 
1.2 
4-3 
3 4 
9 9 
9.3 
17.7 
16.3 
2. 8 
33-3 
1.8 
3 1 0 , 4 9 9 
ALL TRADES 
(699 UNIONS) 
11.4 
8.7 
41.2 
13.6 
4.5 
6.2 
IO.I 
4.2 
1,473,593 
21.9 
1.9 
4.8 
11.9 
12.1 
9.0 
11.9 
13.3 
9.6 
3. 8 
1 ,473,593 
SOURCE Board of Trade, Reporto n Trade Unions i nigo8-io (London, 1912), lxxvi-lxxxi. 
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The weekly benefit was supposed to be enough to enable un-
employed members to subsist without turning to charity or the 
Poor Law, and it usually was. Beveridge maintains that union 
members receiving unemployment benefits hardly ever applied to 
local distress committees for assistance. He also states, however, 
that the typical weekly benefit alone was too small to provide sub-
sistence for a worker and his family; it had "to be supplemented 
. . . by the earnings of wife and children, by private saving, by 
assistance from fellow-workmen and neighbours . . . and in 
other ways." Nonetheless, union benefits prolonged "almost in-
definitely the resisting power of the unemployed. "35 
Unemployment Relief for Low-Skilled Workers The Crusade 
Against Outrelief strove greatly to reduce, if not eliminate, the 
payment of poor relief outside of workhouses to unemployed 
workers. It faced its first real test during the recession of 1878/79. 
The LGB and the cos pressured local boards of guardians not to 
grant outdoor relief to the unemployed, and the cos also tried to 
block the indiscriminate use of charity. Their policies were espe-
cially successful in east London, where outdoor relief for the un-
employed was virtually eliminated by the mid-1870s. Those who 
applied for poor relief during the downturn of the late 1870s were 
offered a place in the Poplar "test workhouse." The cos also suc-
ceeded in keeping the Lord Mayor from starting a Mansion House 
Relief Fund, as had occurred in 1860/61 and 1866/67, although 
local unorganized charity must have increased.36 
Outside of London, the policies of the LGB and the cos were 
less successful. Many Poor Law unions that had begun to shift to 
workhouse relief in the early 1870s felt compelled to provide out-
door relief to the unemployed in 1878/79. In those unions that re-
sisted the temptation to provide outdoor relief, local governments 
and voluntary agencies adopted ad hoc measures for relieving the 
unemployed. The typical procedure was for a city's mayor to set 
up an emergency fund whenever distress reached a certain level: 
"[The mayor] issued an appeal in the Press or by letter, the re-
sponse to which in the form of donations was of course very un-
certain, varying with his personal popularity as well as with the 
35 Beveridge, Unemployment, 225. 
36 Pat Ryan, "Politics and Relief: East London Unions in the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries," in Rose (ed.), The Poor and the City: The English Poor Law, 145-150; 
Jones, Outcast London, 278. 
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general opinion of the wealthier classes as to the existence of ex-
ceptional distress. . . . The distribution was usually undertaken by a 
committee formed either from a few people selected by the 
Mayor, or from the borough councilors, or from a public meeting 
to which representatives of charitable agencies and others were 
specifically invited."37 
During the winters of 1878/79 and 1879/80, emergency 
funds were initiated in several large cities. For example, the Man-
chester and Salford District Provident Society, a philanthropic or-
ganization "dominated by the elite of Manchester's commercial 
and industrial bourgeoisie," raised ^26,000 for the "temporary re-
lief of distressed operatives." These emergency funds typically 
provided the type of indiscriminate relief that the cos strenuously 
opposed.38 
The provision of emergency funds for the unemployed was 
even more pronounced during the downturn from 1884 to 1886. 
The largest, and most notorious, of these funds was London's 
Mansion House Fund of 1886, established by the Lord Mayor in 
response to unemployed workers' demands for assistance, despite 
the opposition of the cos. A riot in the West End of London 
shortly thereafter by 20,000 workers—mostly unemployed dock 
workers and building laborers—led to a rapid influx of money, 
eventually reaching £78,600. The central committee that admin-
istered the fund attempted at the outset to ensure that relief was 
given only to "respectable" workers who were temporarily unem-
ployed, but most districts relaxed these rules almost instantly, 
granting assistance to applicants indiscriminately. The result was an 
"orgie of relief in which most of the assistance went to the "un-
deserving" chronically unemployed. As a result, the 1886 Mansion 
House Fund caused a "widespread revulsion" among the middle 
class against "indiscriminate almsgiving to the unemployed."39 
The story of the Mansion House Fund reveals a serious unin-
tended consequence of the Crusade Against Outrelief—the de-
37 On the use of outdoor relief in 1878/79, see, for example, Richard H. Trainor, Black 
Country Elites: The Exercise of Authority in an Industrialized Area, 1830—1900 (Oxford, 1993), 
305-309. The quotation is from Cyril Jackson and J. C. Pringle's 1909 report on unemploy-
ment assistance since 1886 for the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws—Parliamentary Pa-
pers, Report. . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance given to the "Unemployed*' since 1886 as a 
means of Relieving Distress outside the Poor Law (1909, XLIV), 72. 
38 Webb and Webb, Minority Report, 100; Kidd, "Charity Organization," 52, 54. 
39 Jones, Outcast London, 291-294, 298-300; Harris, Unemployment and Politics, i n . 
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cline of options for assistance available to cyclically unemployed 
low-skilled workers during the 1870s. Most workers felt a strong 
stigma against entering the workhouse, and the cos was unable, 
and unwilling, to relieve more than a small share of the unem-
ployed. When levels of distress increased during downturns, the 
unemployed pressured local governments for aid. Feelings of 
compassion, guilt, and fear among the middle and upper classes led 
to the launching of emergency funds and the granting of indis-
criminate relief. To many, the consequences of the Mansion 
House Fund's lax administration were far worse than the conse-
quences of outdoor poor relief had been. The Crusade Against 
Outrelief had succeeded in reducing the relief roles, but the 
downturn of 1884 to 1886 showed that it was unable to cope with 
cyclical unemployment.40 
The experiences of 1878 to 1880 and 1884 to 1886 convinced 
many that government involvement was necessary to relieve the 
cyclically unemployed. Government officials searched for a 
method that local governments could administer and finance 
without the stigma of the Poor Law. Not long after the riot of the 
unemployed in London, Joseph Chamberlain, president of the 
LGB, issued a circular advising boards of guardians and municipal 
authorities to set up work relief projects that did "not involve the 
stigma of pauperism," did "not compete with that of other labour-
ers at present in employment," and did "not. . . interfere with re-
sumption of regular employment in their own trades by those who 
seek it." To ensure the employment of respectable workers, all 
"men employed [had to] be engaged on the recommendation of 
the guardians as persons whom . . . it [was] undesirable to send to 
the workhouse, or to treat as subjects for pauper relief." Finally, in 
order not to compete with private employment, "the wages paid 
[had to] be something less than the wages ordinarily paid for simi-
lar work."41 
The LGB reissued the Chamberlain circular in 1887, 1891, 
1892, 1893, and 1895. Information about the number of munici-
40 During the downturn of 1878-1881, the London cos offered relief to slightly more than 
one-third of applicants; 22% were referred to the local guardians or other local agencies; and 
43% were refused. Robert Humphreys, Poor Relief and Charity, 1869-1945 (Basingstoke, 2001), 
67-68. 
41 The Chamberlain Circular is reprinted in David Englander, Poverty and Poor Law Reform 
in 19th Century Britain, 1834—1914 (London, 1998), 110-111. 
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palities that adopted work relief projects is available only for the 
winter of 1892/93, when a Board of Trade inquiry found that 
ninety-six local authorities had initiated some form of public em-
ployment in response to the issuance of the circular; thirty-three of 
them were in London. The forms of work relief included road re-
pairing, road sweeping, sewerage work, stone breaking, snow re-
moval, leveling land, and planting trees. Few local authorities 
offered full-time work to those who applied; rather, they dispersed 
the work among all of the applicants. Each person typically was 
employed two or three days per week. For example, from mid-
December 1892 through April 1893 the Corporation of Leeds em-
ployed 1,103 me n to excavate and level ground for new parks. 
Each person was employed three days a week; the average man 
was given about sixty days' work. Wages were $d. an hour for a 
nine-hour day, making each worker's earnings about 11.255. per 
week.42 
The borough of West Ham, just east of London, initiated re-
lief works during six of the ten winters from 1895/96 to 1904/05. 
From November 1904 to May 1905, the borough council em-
ployed 5,271 men to lay out and pave streets and to paint and clean 
buildings. In order to distribute the available work fairly, every ap-
plicant was offered two to three days' work until all of them had 
been employed, at which point the first applicants were offered 
another two days work. The rate of pay was jd. per hour, for an 
eight-hour day.43 
Sometimes charities worked together with local authorities. 
In the winter of 1895, James Bell, the Lord Provost of Glasgow, 
initiated relief work breaking stones; an average of 1,036 men 
were employed per day for thirty-six days. The total cost of the 
project was £4,854. When the weather grew more severe, the 
Lord Provost, unwilling to raise taxes any further to provide work, 
set up a relief fund and appealed in the local newspapers for contri-
butions to enable the local authorities to "give food, fuel, and 
clothing to those who were suffering terribly." Within eight days, 
42 Parliamentary Papers, Agencies and Methods for Dealing with the Unemployed (1893/4, 
LXXXII), 212, 222-228. Similar projects were initiated in other years. In the winters of 1903/ 
04 and 1904/05, the Corporation of Leeds employed 2,644 and 2,384 men, respectively, to 
paint and to work on parks and roads. As before, each worker was employed three days a 
week, and paid $d. per hour for a nine-hour day. Parliamentary Papers, Report. . . on the Effects 
of Employment or Assistance, 359. 
43 Parliamentary Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance, 541, 551. 
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the Citizens' Relief Fund had received £9,586 in cash and £1,362 
"worth of food, provisions, coals, and clothing." Eleven soup 
kitchens sprang up throughout the city; coal, boots, and clothing 
were distributed to those in need; 22,669 grocery tickets were al-
located; and rent arrears were paid.44 
Similarly, in the winter of 1904/05, several London newspa-
pers raised relief funds for West Ham. The Daily News raised 
£11,800, £7,000 of which went to work relief; the rest was used 
to purchase bread, groceries, and coal, which was distributed to 
the poor. The Daily Telegraph raised £14,835, much of it for the 
local clergy and the Salvation Army to distribute to the poor. Al-
together, newspaper funds raised £27,900 for relief of the unem-
ployed, slightly more than the £27,260 spent on work relief by 
the borough council.45 
In view of the fact that the relief works outlined in the 
Chamberlain circular were supposed to employ workers "tempo-
rarily deprived of employment," almost all of the projects under-
taken between 1886 and 1905 must be deemed failures. Data on 
the occupations of applicants for work relief in two London dis-
tricts and five provincial cities in 1892/93 are given in Table 5. In 
six of the districts/cities, the majority of applicants were general or 
"chronically irregular" laborers. For example, in the London bor-
ough of Lambeth, 69 percent of the applicants for work relief were 
classified as general laborers; another 12 percent were carmen, 
stablemen, porters, messengers, or street traders. In Leeds, where 
work relief was initiated in response to an "acute depression of the 
iron trades," 23 percent of the applicants were from the engineer-
ing and metal trades, whereas 49 percent were general laborers. 
Jackson and Pringle concluded from their study of work relief 
programs that "the man for whom . . . [relief works] were de-
signed is not known to have had work from them yet."46 
The Unemployed Workmen Act of igo5 Public awareness of 
unemployment as a problem increased during the late 1880s. The 
reason for the change in public perception is not entirely clear, but 
44 Parliamentary Papers, Third Report from the Select Committee on Distress from want of Em-
ployment (1895, IX), 232-233, 515, 519-520. 
45 Parliamentary Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance, 108—109; 
Howarth and Wilson, West Ham, 346-348. 
46 Parliamentary Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance, 39. 
Table 5 Percent of Applicants for Work Relief by Occupation in Various Cities, 1892-1893 
OCCUPATION KENSINGTON LAMBETH LEEDS LIVERPOOL LEICESTER SHEFFIELD GLASGOW 
Building trades 
Skilled 
Painters 
Laborers 
Engineering and metals 
Textiles 
Clothing, leather 
Misc. skilled 
General laborers 
Carmen, etc. 
Warehousemen and clerks 
Messengers and porters 
Other 
Number of applicants 
2.8 
3-8 
0. 0 
0.9 
0. 0 
O.I 
0.9 
86.5 
2.9 
0. 0 
0.6 
1.6 
1,056 
3.0 
5.6 
0. 0 
2.7 
0.0 
0.6 
3.5 
693 
74 
1.0 
2.4 
4.5 
1,877 
0.6 
5.i 
0. 0 
22.6 
5-3 
3.9 
1.1 
49-5 
0. 0 
0. 0 
0. 0 
11.9 
1,874 
1-4 
0.6 
25.7 
0.3 
0. 0 
0. 0 
0.4 
23.8 
36.8 
5-3 
1.6 
4.0 
3,774 
2. 2 
3.1 
11.3 
2. 2 
12.2 
50.7 
1.0 
12.3 
1.3 
0.5 
0. 0 
3-2 
1,747 
2.4 
2. 2 
0.1 
28.8 
0.1 
0.1 
11.8 
50.8 
1 9 
0.7 
0.4 
0.8 
1,008 
1.6 
2.3 
2. 0 
23.9 
34 
1.8 
4.9 
56.8 
1.8 
0.3 
0. 2 
0.9 
2,801 
SOURCE Parliamentary Papers, Agencies and Methods for Dealing with the Unemployed (1893/94, LXXXII), 210-211, 233. 
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the publication of Booth's study of poverty in London—the first 
volume of which appeared in 1889—and the increased agitation 
by the unemployed were probably instrumental. Socialist groups 
like the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) began to organize 
protest marches at times of high unemployment during the mid-
1880s. Pressure for new government policies to deal with the un-
employed declined during the prosperity of the late 1880s, but re-
appeared during the downturn from 1893 to !895. In response to 
the high level of distress in the winter of 1894/95, the government 
set up the Select Committee on Distress from Want of Employ-
ment. Nothing of practical importance came from it, but it bought 
time for the government until the pressure for reform died down 
when the economy returned to normal during the late 1890s. 
When unemployment rates increased sharply in 1904/05, demand 
that the government intervene returned. Primarily at the instiga-
tion of the SDF, demonstrators in London, Liverpool, Manchester, 
and other major cities "demanded that great works should be car-
ried out by the municipalities on which they should be em-
ployed."47 
In response to this pressure, Parliament in 1905 adopted the 
Unemployed Workmen Act, which established distress commit-
tees in all twenty-nine metropolitan boroughs and in all municipal 
boroughs and urban districts with populations exceeding 50,000. 
The committees—comprised of nominees chosen by the local 
boards of guardians, borough councils, and charitable organiza-
tions—were empowered to register applicants for relief and pro-
vide temporary employment to those "deserving" applicants who 
previously had been regularly employed, had resided in the local-
ity for the previous twelve months, were "well-conducted and 
thrifty," and had dependents. The work projects were to be of 
"actual and substantial utility," and workers' total remuneration 
was to be less than would be earned by unskilled laborers.48 
47 Charles Booth, Labour and Life of the People (London 1889— 1891), 2v.; Harris, Unemploy-
ment and Politics, 6—101; Gertrude Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination 
of the Late Victorians (New York, 1991), 40-53. The activities of the SDF are discussed in Ken-
neth D. Brown, Labour and Unemployment, igoo—igi4 (Newton Abbot, 1971). Quotation from 
the testimony of Walter Long, president of the Local Government Board, before the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws: Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence . . . of Witnesses relat-
ing chiefly to the subject of Unemployment (1910, XLVIII), 59. 
48 Boroughs and urban districts with populations between 10,000 and 50,000 could apply to 
the LGB for permission to establish a distress committee. By 1909, fourteen such districts had 
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The Act enabled localities to levy a rate of .$d. in the pound 
for administrative expenses, which could be increased to id. with 
the consent of the LGB. Money from the rates was not to be used 
for work relief. Instead, relief projects were to be funded exclu-
sively from voluntary contributions. The Act's framers apparently 
believed that, once the distress committees and the machinery for 
administering relief were in place, the charitable public would 
contribute generously to relief funds during times of distress. This 
system worked smoothly at first. In 1905, Queen Alexandra's ap-
peal to the public for funds drew nearly £154,000, of which 
£125,000 was distributed to distress committees throughout Brit-
ain and Ireland.49 
Despite the success of the Queen's Fund, few in the govern-
ment believed that such appeals could be repeated annually. In 
1906, Parliament decided to make a grant of £200,000 to local dis-
tress committees; similar grants were made in the four following 
years. The Parliamentary grant was meant to supplement volun-
tary contributions, but it led to a sharp reduction in contributions. 
According to Harris, "the charitable public declined to subscribe 
voluntarily to a scheme for which they were being compulsorily 
taxed." The grants also led many local authorities to stop levying 
the .$d. rate for administrative expenses. Evidence of the changing 
nature of relief-project funding is given in Table 6, which com-
pares the sources for the receipts of distress committees in 1906/ 
07—the first year of the Parliamentary grant—and 1909/10. In 
1909/10, the distress committees received £146,835 from the Par-
liamentary grant, or £41,415 more than they had received in 
1906/07. During the same period, income from local rates and 
voluntary contributions declined by £46,774. By 1909/10 the 
majority of funding for local work relief projects came from the 
treasury rather than from local contributions and taxes, as the Un-
employed Workmen Act had envisaged.50 
established committees. The Act also provided for the formation of a Central (Unemployed) 
Body in London to administer relief and coordinate the work of the metropolitan distress 
committees. The best discussions of the Unemployed Workmen Act are in Beveridge, Unem-
ployment, 162—191; Harris, Unemployment and Politics, 157—210. 
49 Slightly more than half of the donations, £65,900, was distributed to the London and 
West Ham distress committees. The fund also gave £9,450 to assist migrants to Canada, and 
made grants to the Salvation Army, the Church Army, and other charitable agencies (Parlia-
mentary Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance, 82-83). 
50 Harris, Unemployment and Politics, 179. 
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Table 6 Sources of funds for distress commit tees , 1906/07 and 1909/10 
Parliamentary grant 
Local rates 
Voluntary contributions 
Other sources (including 
repayments for work done) 
Total receipts 
1906/07 
,£105,420 
90,088 
36,202 
30,759 
262,469 
40.2% 
34.3% 
13.8% 
11.7% 
1909/10 
£146,835 
68,069 
11,447 
30,463 
256,814 
57.2% 
26.5% 
4 .5% 
11.9% 
NOTE For 1906/07, voluntary contributions include donations from the Queen's Unem-
ployed Fund. 
SOURCE Data on the receipts of distress committees are from Board of Trade, Labour Gazette, 
XV (1907), 327; XVIII (1910), 370. 
The Act stated that distress committees were to investigate 
the applicants for relief and to provide work for "deserving" 
workers who were temporarily unemployed because of a "disloca-
tion of trade." However, the distress committees proved no better 
at separating the temporarily unemployed from the chronically 
underemployed than had previous relief committees. In 1907/08, 
general or casual laborers comprised 53.3 percent of all applicants 
for relief. Another 19.4 percent of applicants were employed in 
the building trades. A large share of these men were unskilled la-
borers who were more or less casually employed.51 
Reports of individual distress committees give a better idea of 
the composition of the applicants for relief. In 1905/06 the Man-
chester distress committee registered 1,532 applicants for work re-
lief. Of these, 794 (51.8 percent) were general laborers, 201 (13.1 
percent) were laborers in the building trades, and 164 (10.7 per-
cent) were carmen, stablemen, porters, and messengers. Alto-
gether, three-quarters of applicants for relief could be classified as 
general or casual laborers. The cos, analyzing the registration pa-
pers of 2,000 applicants in West Ham in 1905/06, determined that 
54.5 percent were casual laborers, 11.7 percent were laborers in 
the building trades, and 3.4 percent were carmen. Only 11.9 per-
cent of the applicants were classified as skilled workers, and half of 
them were in the building trades and subject to irregular employ-
ment. Only a small share of those given work relief were tempo-
rarily unemployed.52 
51 Beveridge, Unemployment, 168-169. 
52 The data on the occupations of applicants for work relief in Manchester were obtained 
from the Webb Local Government Collection, Part 2: The Poor Law, 307, British Library of 
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Like all previous attempts to assist the unemployed, the Un-
employed Workmen Act accepted the principle of less eligibility; 
that is, workers on relief projects had to earn less than regularly 
employed unskilled workers, in order to preserve work incentives. 
Some distress committees achieved this objective by paying work-
ers on relief projects hourly wages below those of unskilled work-
ers. Others chose to pay "full trade union wage rates per hour" but 
to employ workers for a reduced number of hours per day or for 
two to four days per week.53 
The London Central (Unemployed) Body employed men on 
relief works for forty-three hours per week at 6d. an hour, for a 
weekly income of 21.55. In 1907, regular building laborers in Lon-
don were paid qd. per hour for a fifty-hour week in summer. 
Weekly hours typically were shorter in winter, when relief works 
were in operation. If the work week was six hours shorter in win-
ter than in summer—one hour shorter per day—a man employed 
on a relief project would earn 84 percent as much per week as a 
fully employed laborer in the building trades.54 
Outside of central London, employment on relief projects 
was less continuous. Table 7 presents data on the average number 
of days worked, and the average wages earned, per man, for four-
teen urban districts in February 1907. The average number of days 
worked was less than eight in four locations, and was eighteen or 
more in four locations. The average earnings for the month varied 
from ^ 4 - 2 xn Leicester to £0.7 in Tottenham. Column 5 presents 
estimates of full-time daily wages in winter for the building trades, 
assuming a work day one hour shorter in winter than in summer. 
The average daily wage of men on work relief projects was greater 
than the estimated daily wage of building laborers in Bristol and 
Plymouth, and was 80 percent or more of building laborers' wages 
in East Ham, Tottenham, Brighton, Leicester, Newcastle, and 
Aberdeen. Despite the high wage rates for work relief jobs in 
many cities, the low number of days worked per week meant that 
Political and Economic Science, London. In 1906/07, 63.7% of the applicants for work relief 
in West Ham were classified as casual laborers, and 14.1% were classified as "chronically bad— 
industrially, privately, or both," or physically or mentally incapable of regular work. A mere 
1.5% of applicants were skilled and regular artisans. Howarth and Wilson, West Ham, 370-
372, 376. 
53 Beveridge, Unemployment, 187. 
54 Webb and Webb, Minority Report, 138. Wage data for building trades' laborers are from 
Board of Trade, Eleventh Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom, 1905—IQO6 (London, 
1907), 38-39. 
Table 7 Unemployment Relief under the Unemployed Workmen Act, February 1907 
CITY 
East Ham 
Tot tenham 
West Ham 
Brighton 
Bristol 
Leeds 
Leicester 
Newcastle 
Nor thampton 
Norwich 
Plymouth 
Aberdeen 
Edinburgh 
Glasgow 
NUMBER OF 
MEN GIVEN 
EMPLOYMENT 
733 
i,532 
1,092 
767 
500 
238 
396 
211 
244 
502 
291 
360 
348 
47i 
AVERAGE DAYS 
WORKED PER 
MAN 
7.6 
4.0 
10.0 
6.8 
11.0 
9 9 
21.0 
11.8 
18.3 
17.0 
6.6 
11.9 
18.6 
21.1 
AVERAGE 
WAGES EARNED 
PER MAN 
(SHILLINGS) 
30.6 
13.9 
33-1 
21.6 
44-3 
22.0 
83-8 
37-7 
46.9 
34-1 
24.7 
33-8 
42.8 
42.5 
AVERAGE 
DAILY WAGE 
(SHILLINGS) 
4.0 
3.5 
3.3 
3.2 
4.0 
2.2 
4.0 
3-2 
2.6 
2.0 
3-7 
2.8 
2.3 
2. 0 
ESTIMATED DAILY 
WAGE OF BUILDING 
LABORERS IN WINTER 
(SHILLINGS) 
4-3 
4-3 
4-3 
3-9 
3-9 
4-i 
4-4 
3.8 
3.6 
3-5 
3-3 
3.3 
3-5 
3-6 
RATIO OF WORK 
RELIEF WAGE TO 
BUILDING LABORERS' 
WAGE 
0.93 
0.8l 
O.77 
0.82 
1.03 
O.54 
O.9I 
O.84 
O.72 
O.57 
1.12 
O.85 
0.66 
0.56 
NOTE The work day for building laborers was one hour shorter in winter than in summer. 
SOURCES Unemployment relief data from Board of Trade, Labour Gazette, XV (1907), 67. Wage data from Board of Trade, Eleventh Abstract of Labour Statistics 
of the United Kingdom, igo5~igo6 (London, 1907), 38-39. 
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such jobs clearly were not a substitute for full-time employment in 
the building trade. However, many building laborers did not work 
full time in the winter months, and many other casual labor mar-
kets also experienced "seasonal slackness" in winter. Because la-
borers in these markets could alternate work relief with private-
sector employment, it is not surprising that the majority of appli-
cants for work relief were general or casual laborers, or that the 
same men tended to reapply for work relief year after year.55 
Some historians maintain that the Unemployed Workmen 
Act "marked a decisive turning-point in national policy" because 
it accepted "a measure of national responsibility" for relieving the 
unemployed. Most contemporaries, however, viewed the Act not 
as the beginning of state intervention in the labor market but as 
the last in a long line of failed attempts to use municipal relief 
works to solve the unemployment problem.56 
THE LESSONS OF VICTORIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF For m a n y , the 
Unemployed Workmen Act was merely a stop-gap measure. The 
same pressure that led to its adoption led the Conservative govern-
ment to appoint the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and 
Relief of Distress in 1905. The Commission's inquiries into the 
working of the Poor Law and other policies to relieve "distress 
arising from want of employment" lasted for three years, resulting 
in two large reports published in 1909—a majority report signed 
by the chairman and fourteen others, and a minority report, writ-
ten by the Webbs, signed by Beatrice Webb and three others. 
These reports, and the testimony of individuals who appeared be-
fore the Commission, clearly demonstrate the extent to which the 
proposals for a system of unemployment insurance grew out of the 
lessons learned from the successes and failures of past methods of 
unemployment relief. 
55 Augustus D. Webb, "The Building Trade," in Sidney Webb and Arnold Freeman (eds.), 
Seasonal Trades (London, 1912), 312-3 93; Jones, Outcast London. In West Ham, 67.6% of those 
who were given employment on work relief projects in the winter of 1905/06 reapplied for 
work the following winter (Howarth and Wilson, West Ham, 378). 
56 Quotation from Maurice Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State (London, 1968), 188. 
57 For a detailed discussion of the Royal Commission, see Harris, Unemployment and Politics, 
245-264; Kathleen Woodroofe, "The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, 1905-09," Inter-
national Review of Social History, XXII (1977), 137-164; Alan M. McBriar, An Edwardian Mixed 
Doubles: The Bosanquets versus the Webbs (Oxford, 1987). The list of those who testified before 
the Commission includes Sidney Webb, Beveridge (at the time a member of London's Cen-
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Those who testified before the Commission almost unani-
mously condemned the use of relief works as a method for assist-
ing the temporarily unemployed, as did Jackson and Pringle, who 
authored a report for the Commission about the effects of unem-
ployment relief since 1886. In a passage quoted approvingly by 
both the majority and minority reports, Jackson and Pringle con-
cluded that "the Municipal Relief Works, encouraged by 
Mr. Chamberlain's circular in 1886, have been in operation for 
twenty years, and must, we think, be pronounced a complete fail-
ure—a failure accentuated by the attempt to organise them by the 
Unemployed Workmen's Act of 1905." The major problem with 
relief works was that they attracted chronically underemployed 
workers rather than the temporarily unemployed for whom they 
were intended.58 
Everyone who testified before the Commission, and many 
other contemporaries, were impressed with the existing unem-
ployment-insurance schemes of trade unions. Unemployment in-
surance was generally regarded as an efficient method of reducing 
the distress of cyclical unemployment that should be extended to 
more workers, although the matter of how to achieve such a result 
generated disagreement. Sidney Webb and Jackson argued that a 
system of compulsory insurance, administered by the government, 
was neither practical nor desirable. They supported an extension 
of the system of voluntary union-provided insurance in which the 
government would pay part of the costs, to encourage unions of 
low-skilled, and low-wage, workers to provide unemployment 
insurance. Such a subsidy would allow every worker above the 
grade of casual laborer "to provide against the contingency of un-
employment in the method most congenial to himself"59 
tral Unemployed Body), A. Wilson Fox of the Board of Trade, and Arthur Bowley, an early 
advocate of countercyclical government spending to reduce unemployment during down-
turns. 
58 Parliamentary Papers, Report . . . on the Effects of Employment or Assistance, 148. Sidney 
Webb concluded that any attempt to assist skilled workers with work relief was "doomed to 
failure," because "the practically inexhaustible flood of casual labourers flows in and swamps 
the register, swamps the relief works, and swamps everything else that a despairing Distress 
Committee attempts" (Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence . . . of Witnesses further relating 
to the subject of Unemployment [1910, XLIX], 186). 
59 Beveridge estimated that in 1905/06 the cost per man/week of relieving unemployed 
workers was twice as high on work-relief projects administered by London's Central Unem-
ployed Body as it was for unemployment insurance administered by London trade unions. See 
his testimony in Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence . . . of Witnesses relating chiefly to the 
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Beveridge agreed that trade unions possessed "certain natural 
advantages" in the provision of unemployment insurance, but he 
argued that insurance also could be administered efficiently by la-
bor exchanges. He disagreed with the Webbs' assertion that many 
trade unions could not afford to provide unemployment benefits 
without government assistance, since the cost of insurance was rel-
atively small: "There is no reason why the trade unions themselves 
should not extend the system of unemployed benefits." Fox and 
Smith supported a compulsory state-run system administered by 
labor exchanges, but with a state subvention in addition to contri-
butions from workers and employers.60 
Both the majority and minority reports supported the exten-
sion of unemployment insurance to a larger share of the work-
force. Although the majority report did not recommend a specific 
plan, it noted with approval the system in Ghent, Belgium, where 
the municipality subsidized the provision of unemployment insur-
ance by trade unions. The report concluded that "the establish-
ment and promotion of Unemployment Insurance, especially 
amongst unskilled and unorganised labour . . . is of such national 
importance as to justify, under specified conditions, contributions 
from public funds towards its furtherance." It recommended 
that the state subsidy be offered not only to trade unions but 
also to friendly societies that provided unemployment benefits 
to their members. If large numbers of workers remained unin-
sured, the government could set up a supplementary insurance 
scheme.61 
The minority report rejected the establishment of a state-run 
compulsory insurance plan, on the grounds that it would have an 
adverse effect on union membership. It argued that trade-union 
organization possessed certain advantages for dealing with unem-
ployment, but that, contrary to Beveridge's claim, the high cost of 
insurance put it beyond the means of all but a small share of 
subject of Unemployment, 17. Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence . . . of Witnesses further re 
lating to the subject of Unemployment, 188-189, 194; Jackson, Unemployment and Trade Unions 
(London, 1910), 34-39. 
60 Beveridge, Unemployment, 227-230; Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence . . . of Wit 
nesses relating chiefly to the subject of Unemployment, 27, 450-453; H. Llewellyn Smith, "Eco-
nomic Security and Unemployment Insurance," Economic Journal, XX (1910), 527-528. 
61 Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress 
(1909, xxxvii), 415-421. 
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"better paid artizans [sic]." The report proposed that the state 
adopt a version of the Ghent system, providing trade unions with 
"a subvention from public funds, in order to assist them to extend 
their own insurance against Unemployment."62 
The majority and minority reports of the Poor Law Commis-
sion were published at a time (1909) when unemployment rates 
were probably higher than at any time since 1878/79. This excep-
tionally high unemployment, along with the failure of the Unem-
ployed Workmen Act to relieve the temporarily unemployed, 
induced Parliament in 1911 to pass the National Insurance Act, 
Part II of which established a compulsory system of unemploy-
ment insurance in a limited number of industries. The govern-
ment's solution differed from that envisioned in either the 
majority or minority report, in that it was compulsory, state-run, 
and financed by contributions from employers and workers 
through a payroll tax (amounting to 75 percent of the cost) and 
from the state (the remaining 25 percent of the cost). The Poor 
Law had been financed by a local property tax. Similarly, the mu-
nicipal relief works adopted from 1886 to 1905 were financed out 
of local taxation, and the Unemployed Workmen Act was funded, 
at least initially, by a combination of charitable contributions and 
local taxation. The adoption of national insurance marked the end 
of private charity as an important source of assistance for the un-
employed.63 
The history of unemployment relief from 1834 to 1911 was not a 
"unilinear progression in collective benevolence" from poor relief 
to national unemployment insurance. A combination of poor re-
lief and private charity was used to assist cyclically unemployed 
workers for three decades after 1834. The relief provided was not 
especially generous, but it was enough to ensure that unemployed 
workers and their families could subsist in good health. The un-
62 Webb and Webb, Minority Report, 288-293, 343-
63 Boyer and Hatton, "New Estimates of British Unemployment," 662. The industries 
with a compulsory system of unemployment insurance were building, construction of works, 
shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, iron founding, construction of vehicles, and 
sawmilling. A total of 2.25 million workers were insured against unemployment—about 20% 
of employed males. The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 extended compulsory unem-
ployment insurance to virtually all workers except the self-employed and those in agriculture 
or domestic service. 
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employed were relatively certain of receiving assistance, and relief 
had little stigma attached to it.64 
A major shift in policy toward the unemployed, the Crusade 
Against Outrelief, occurred in the 1870s, largely in response to the 
crisis of the Poor Law in the 1860s. However, the policies of the 
Crusade—a combination of self-help and charity—broke down 
during the downturn between 1884 and 1886. The government 
responded by encouraging municipalities to set up work-relief 
projects when unemployment was high, but such projects proved 
unable to relieve a large share of the temporarily unemployed. In 
general, the relief provided under the various policies adopted 
from 1870 to 1911 was less certain than that available before 1870, 
and it typically carried a stigma. Perhaps for this reason, every cy-
clical downturn from 1886 onward put pressure on the govern-
ment to adopt a national system of unemployment relief. In 1911, 
Parliament responded by adopting the world's first compulsory 
system of unemployment insurance. 
64 Quotation from Richard M. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare State (London, 1958), 34. 
